Ex-post Stable and Fair Payoff Allocation for Renewable Energy Aggregation

Published:

Problem setting: In a market environment, each renewable power producers (RPP) is asked to submit some (specifically designed) information. It is highly desirable that this information to be as little as possible. Then based on the received information, the aggregator makes some decision. Finally, the reward of the aggregator needs to be distributed among the members such that

  • The information be as little as possible, and yet be enough for the aggregator to be able to perform optimally.
  • The decision making procedure that the aggregator follows ensures optimality of the outcome for the aggregator.
  • Each RPP receives at least the same payoff as it would get if it participated in the market without the aggregator (individual rationality).
  • Each group of RPPs receives at least the same overall payoff as what they would get if they formed a group outside the aggregation and participated in the market without the aggregator (group rationality).
  • budget balance

Method: We ask each RPP to submit just a single number. So, instead of submitting all the possible options for this information, for example, probability distribution, scenarios, etc., we ask the each RPP to submit just a single number. Then, based on the received numbers, the aggregator participates in the market, and distributes the payoff among the RPPs.



To see the pdf of the paper, see link.